This article examines how social anthropologists' expertise was employed in the international war crimes trials heard at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Introduction
Anthropologists act as experts in a wide range of legal proceedings including indigenous rights claims (Clifford 1988; Paine 1996; Rosen 1977; Thuen 2004 ) and asylum cases (Good 2004; . This article presents an analysis of anthropologists as experts in a new legal arena, international war crimes trials, where the debate about the nature of anthropological expertise and its relation with the law and other bodies of knowledge plays out.
Specifically, it examines the testimony by two anthropologists who were called by defence counsel to rebut the reports submitted by prosecution experts in the trials heard at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is an international criminal tribunal set up as 'sui generic independent institution' seated in Freetown that was set up by an agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Court has a remarkable rate of convictions, all the accused who stood trial were found guilty and sentenced to long prison sentences.
The reports submitted by these experts and the evidence they gave in court is of particular interest for anthropologists. The rapidly expanding field of international criminal justice has resulted in a growing demand for anthropological expertise (Eltringham 2013; Wilson 2011) . This is likely to increase further due to the International Criminal Court's focus on subSaharan Africa and the prominence of anthropologists in African studies. It is therefore important to discuss the challenges and experiences of anthropologists who testified before international criminal tribunals. Beyond the courtroom, the present analysis also speaks to the wider debate about expertise and how it can be studied from a social-scientific perspective (Carr 2010; Collins and Evans 2007; Jasanoff 1995; .
This article adds a new perspective to the debate about anthropologists as experts. In the literature, there is a tendency to emphasise fundamental epistemological differences, and as a consequence, incommensurability between the law, on the one hand, and anthropological knowledge production, on the other (Alvarez and Loucky 1992; Campisi 1991; Clifford 1988; Holden 2011; Kandel 1992a; Rigby and Sevareid 1992; Rosen 1977; Thuen 2004) . Recently, several studies of asylum cases (Good 2004; and international war crimes trials (Eltringham 2013; Wilson 2011 ) have examined more closely the role played by anthropologists and historians in the strategies of the parties calling them as experts. This shift in emphasis to the strategies pursued in court brings the epistemological contest between different types of expertise and their role in legal fact-finding in focus.
In the trials heard at the Special Court, the anthropologists who were called as experts were asked to address the importance of certain aspects of sociocultural life during the civil war in Sierra Leone. It is significant that both anthropologists were called by the defence to rebut the prosecution experts'
reports. The judges, however, refused to adopt the anthropologists' arguments and did not share their concerns about the methodology and conceptual framework employed by the prosecution experts, a military officer and a civil rights activist. This was, this article will argue, due to universalistic assumptions and categories shared by the prosecution experts and the judges who were reluctant to recognize the challenge posed by Sierra
Leone's socio-cultural specificities to the application of international criminal law.
This article will first situate the debate between the experts at the Special Court in relation to the literature on anthropological and historical expertise in court. It is a piece of courtroom ethnography based on direct observation of Hoffman's testimony, a close reading of the transcripts as well as interviews with Hoffman, Thorsen, the prosecutor, the defence lawyers and one of the judges. The first part of the analysis examines the discussion about the methodology employed by prosecution and defence experts. The second part focuses on the anthropologists' attempts to expose the universalistic and simplistic assumptions informing the prosecution experts' reports. The third part discusses the impact of the experts' testimony on the judgements and discusses its implications for anthropologists in international war crimes trials and the current debate on expertise in the social sciences.
Uneasy Fact-finding: Anthropologists as Experts
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The discussion on anthropologists as experts in trials, both criminal and civil, has mainly centred on the question whether anthropological knowledge production can be adapted to legal fact-finding. According to Rosen, 'there are few roles that confront conscientious anthropologists with more serious scholarly and ethical problems than those posed by their appearance in legal proceedings as expert witnesses' because 'the expert witness is brought, usually by one of the adversary parties, into a legal proceeding whose form and goals often appear foreign, if not overtly antithetical, to scholarly capacities and purposes' (Rosen 1977: 555) . Clifford (1988) describes how scholars called as experts are compelled to abide by the law's strict binary logic employed to establish legal facts and arrive at legal decisions. They were pressed 'for sharp, unambiguous opinions ' (1988: 318) and provide clear 'yes or no ' answers (1988: 321) . This is said to run counter to anthropological knowledge production, which is more concerned with explaining socio-cultural realities and structures shaping human agency rather than ascribing individual responsibility or liability (cf. Kandel 1992a).
This unease with the logic of the trial and the law are by no means unique to anthropologists. Historians who testify in criminal and civil cases have expressed similar concerns arising from epistemological and methodological differences (Evans 2002) . At international criminal tribunals, Wilson shows how experts often have grappled with the challenges of presenting multifaceted histories in the setting of a trial where they are exposed to crossexamination and pressed for unequivocal statements (Wilson 2011: 202-206 ).
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Confronted with fundamental epistemological and methodological differences historians such as Rousso (2002) , a French historian who refused to testify as expert in the trial against Maurice Papon, deem historiography to be utterly unsuitable to legal fact-finding and, consequently, refuse to act as expert witnesses (Rousso 2002: 86) .
However, Rousso's position is not widely shared by social scientists and historians. Evans (2002) , for instance, takes issue with Rousso and makes a case for the use of historical expertise in criminal and civil trials. Evans, who acted as expert in the libel case of David Irving, points out that historians can help the courts by providing expertise the lawyers cannot be expected to possess. In contrast to Rousso, Evans highlights ways in which historians can benefit from the courts' directions that might push their research in new, promising areas (Evans 2002: 343-344 ).
This view is shared by the anthropologists writing on the subject such as Rosen (1977) and Good (2004; 
Contested expertise
The first hurdle a prospective expert witness has to take is whether he or she is recognized by the court as expert. In general, an expert witness is defined in terms of a specific knowledge acquired through experience, training or education to assist the court in assessing the evidence or determine the facts (Good 2007; Jasanoff 1995; Kandel 1992b: 56) . The Special Court's judges From the perspective of a military man this might be a perfectly sound method but it did not meet the standards applied to anthropological fieldwork, as Hoffman pointed out.
Thorsen had similar criticisms with regard to Bangura's report. She pointed out that Bangura had merely collected statements of women who allegedly were 'bush wives' without giving background information or providing the socio-cultural background against which these statements should be placed.
PROSECUTOR: …did you consult the report of Mrs Bangura?
WITNESS: I read the report. I found it very flawed on the methodological issues and I found that the quotes she gives in her report, it talks a lot about the circumstances of these -well not even circumstances -it tells a lot about -that women were abducted and that they were being coerced into being bush wives and that they left or stayed with the husband after the war. But inasmuch as she didn't analyse her data, inasmuch as she didn't discuss it but left it to speak on its own, it is actually very difficult to know what she wanted to say with this material. And also, she does not contextualise the whole situation of these women and she collected the data from a large 22 amount of regions. How can we know that everything is the same in those regions? There is a lack of contextualisation.
For Hoffman and Thorsen the methodology used by Iron and Bangura did not meet the norms for scholarly research. Both of them criticized the lack of 'social nuances' (Hoffman) and 'contextualisation (Thorsen) in the prosecution experts' testimony. The next part will examine in more detail how the anthropologists rebutted the testimony of the prosecution experts.
The anthropological perspective
Anthropologists writing about international criminal justice (Eltringham 2013; Wilson 2011 ) emphasise the salience of the trial strategies of the prosecution and defence with regard to the analysis of expert testimony in international war crimes trials. Eltringham takes issue with the idea of an 'epistemological confrontation' (Thuen 2004: 266) and argues that the historians and anthropologists who testified at the ICTR did not consider themselves to be 'engaged in an epistemological contest with the law' (Eltringham 2013: 338) .
To some degree this finding is backed up by my evidence from the Special Court for Sierra Leone where the anthropologists did indeed submit nuanced and detailed reports. Both, however, did consider themselves to be engaged in an epistemological and methodological confrontation -albeit with the prosecution experts rather than the Law. WITNESS: My Lords, I think one of the dynamics that happened within this, the conflict, is that the term "commander" essentially 26 became a synonym, if you will, of the term "patron". That was -the implication in the term "commander" was that this was the kind of relationship that was being pointed to. While listening to the anthropologist's nuanced and contextualised description of the CDF's organisation it occurred to me that his account in many ways resembled those by anthropologists in native title claims in the US. Under US law an indigenous group first had to prove its continued existence as 'tribe' before it could lay claim to a specific territory. In legal terms a 'tribe' was contingent upon several features that bore only little resemblance to actual social organisation of Native American groups and rather reflected European ideas about these 'savage' and 'state-less' societies.
Anthropologists on the plaintiffs' side often criticised concepts such as 'tribe'
or 'land ownership' as too simplistic and static. They pointed out that indigenous identity did not necessarily depend on the existence of 'tribal' institutions or customs. Clifford's (1988) ethnography is a good example of these debates on indigenous identity in the courtroom. Just as the Jack Campisi, the anthropologist who acted as expert witness for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., tried to show that the history of Native Americans was not a simple story of either survival or assimilation Danny
Hoffman tried to show that the Kamajors were in fact a much more complex and contradictory phenomenon than the prosecution assumed, a fluid militarized social movement that provided opportunities for gain and advancement rather than a centralized military organization described by the prosecution and Colonel Iron.
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The question whether the CDF constituted a military organization can be read as an inversion of the central question in the Mashpee-case described by Clifford (1988) . In that case, the plaintiff, the Wampanoag Tribal Council,
Inc. was at pains to prove that the Mashpee community had been governed as an Indian tribe since only recognized tribes could file claims for land restitution under US law. In both cases the main issue was whether an organized group existed but whilst the Mashpee had to qualify as a tribe to have legal standing in a civil law suit over compensation for the loss of ancestral land the three accused leaders of the CDF could be held criminally He elaborated on his motives when I met him after he testified. Initially,
Hoffman had hesitated to act as expert witness because of a strong sense of obligation towards his informants, all former members of the kamajors, as he told me after he had testified. In particular, he was concerned about his informants' anonymity which he had promised to protect. He was worried about future access to the field if his informants felt he had betrayed their trust. Eventually, he decided to write the report because he felt that Iron's report grossly misrepresented the nature of the kamajor movement (cf. Instead, she wrote a critical analysis of the problematic concepts of forced marriage and female agency in West Africa drawing on the anthropological literature and her own fieldwork on gender relations in rural Burkina Faso.
When I interviewed Thorsen in June 2011 she told me that, from her perspective, her main task had been to educate the court by problematizing the concept of 'forced marriage' as it was employed by the prosecution.
rather than providing facts or a different interpretation of facts since she fieldwork experience in Sierra Leone. She was at pains to point out that the category of forced marriage is too simplistic to account for girls' and women's agency even during armed conflict. Although the defence had initially expected her to visit Sierra Leone for a short research in preparation of writing the report they had no objections against her report and submitted it as evidence hoping it would undermine Bangura's report.
It is instructive to compare Hoffman's and Thorsen's approach. Hoffman grappled with the trust placed in him by his informants and was concerned about the possible long-term consequences for his access to the field. Thorsen did not face these ethical problems as she limited her role to a general critique of Bangura's report. But unlike Hoffman her testimony was exclusively concerned with a critique of the abstract concept of bush wives used by Bangura due to a lack of first-hand research experience in Sierra Leone, which adversely affected the relevance of her testimony in the eyes of judges of the trial chamber as the next part shows.
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The judges' take on the experts' testimony
The main task of the expert is to assist the judges with his or her expertise.
The expert reports and testimony constitute merely a fraction of all the evidence assessed by the judges. After weighing all the evidence submitted to them by the parties they decide on the guilt of the accused. Sometimes it is not clear to what extent the judges draw on experts' reports and testimony of if they heed them at all. In some instances, judges draw explicitly on experts'
reports to support their findings (Rosen 1977: 561) .
In the judgement against the leaders of the CDF, the judges of trial chamber mentioned neither Iron's nor Hoffman's reports. With regard to the structure, origins and history of the CDF and the kamajor militia, the subject of Iron's and Hoffman's expert reports, the court relied exclusively on witnesses of fact called by the prosecution who confirmed the prosecution theory of The judgement discussed the question whether forced marriage constitutes a separate crime combining elements of sexual and non-sexual violence, the view held by the prosecution, in some detail (SCSL 2007a: § §701-714, pp. 216-221) . By majority decision, the judges rejected the prosecution's submission and ruled that forced marriage was not a separate crime but, in fact, constituted a form of sexual slavery. As a consequence, they dismissed the charge as redundant (SCSL 2007a: §713, pp. 220) . In their motivation, the judges did not explicitly draw on the expert witnesses. They merely concluded that 'having now examined the whole of the evidence in the case, the Trial Chamber by a majority, is not satisfied that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution is capable of establishing the elements of a non-sexual crime of "forced marriage" independent of the crime of sexual slavery under article 2(g) of the Statute' (SCSL 2007a: §704, p. 217).
The two separate opinions, one concurring and one dissenting, provide much more valuable information on the role played by the experts in the judges'
reasoning. Justice Sebutinde's separate concurring opinion found 'Dr.
Thorsen's report and evidence of little relevance to the issue at hand given the fact that she declined to write on the topic requested of her by the Defence' (Sebutinde 2007: §1, p. 574) .
Justice Sebutinde only referred to Thorsen's testimony when she distinguished 'arranged or inheritance marriages' from the abduction and abuse of women as bush-wives during the civil war in Sierra Leone. During cross-examination, Thorsen had indeed made that distinction but immediately questioned the underlying assumption that all women who became bushwives during the civil war were abducted. Instead, she raised the possibility 'that some might have gone into it on their own free will but young women also had stakes in getting married' (SCSL 2006b: 4). Thorsen insisted on raising fundamental methodological and epistemological questions about the Eurocentric and universalistic categories in international law, which formed the prosecution expert's framework. In her view, these were not categories of social-scientific study but constituted rather normative and simplistic categories employed from a 'rights-based perspective' (Thorsen 2006: 4) .
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Doherty argued against the other two judges that forced marriage is not synonymous with sexual slavery and held that it indeed constituted a separate crime as 'other inhumane act' combining sexual and non-sexual elements stemming from the woman being 'forced into a relationship of a conjugal nature with the perpetrator thereby subsuming the victim's will and undermining the victim's exercise of the right to selfdetermination' (Doherty 2007: §69, p. 595 ).
Both, justice Sebutinde and justice Doherty, relied heavily on Bangura's report and testimony, although they drew different legal conclusions. Unlike
Thorsen's report they found Bangura's testimony 'relevant and very instructive on the subject of forced "marriage" within the Sierra Leone Conflict' (Sebutinde 2007: §11, pp. 577-578) . They explicitly approved of Bangura's methodology. Justice Sebutinde, for instance, approvingly referred to 'in-depth interviews of over 100 former victims of "forced marriage"' conducted by Bangura (Sebutinde 2007: §11, fn. 11, p. 578) 
Conclusions
The anthropologists' critique of Western military and activist concepts did not have a tangible influence on the judges who found the prosecution experts' testimony more useful. Hoffman's and Thorsen's experience resonates with the experience of anthropologists testifying in indigenous rights claims where the judges and jurors rejected the anthropologists' call for the recognition of cultural difference (Campisi 1991; Clifford 1988; Paine 1996) .
In the light of the strategies employed by the prosecution and the defence it is important to remember that both anthropologists testified for the defence.
They were employed to cast doubt on the reports of the prosecution experts but in doing so they also sought to raise fundamental questions about the applicability of universalistic military and legal categories to the messy realities of everyday practices in West Africa. It seems the arguments advanced by the anthropologists suited much better the defence case. This observation should by no means imply that anthropologists invariably act as experts for the defence. In fact, anthropologists have testified as prosecution experts in international criminal trials (Eltringham 2013) and Rosen (1977: 564) Bearing also in mind Rosen's (1977) , Good's (2004) and Wilson's (2011) call to understand better the role played by experts in court Hoffman's and and that a reflective approach exploring the boundaries between expertise and law as well as the multifarious ways in which they influence each other continues to be highly relevant to social anthropology and beyond (cf.
Jasanoff 2003).
As a consequence, anthropologists in international criminal trials might want to avoid advancing a fundamental epistemological and methodological critique of other bodies of expert knowledge and instead emphasise their role as country specialists and suppliers of factual information. They also will have to weigh the pros and cons of entering an adversarial trial in which they will testify for one of the parties. 
